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Jean-Pierre Allegret♣ 
and 
Alain Sand-Zantman♦ 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
This paper analyses the monetary consequences of the Latin-American trade integration process. We 
consider a sample of five countries –Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay- spanning the 
period 1991-2007. The main question raised pertains to the feasibility of a monetary union between 
L.A. economies. To this end, we study whether this set of countries is characterized by business cycle 
synchronization with the occurrence of common shocks, a strong similarity in the adjustment process 
and the convergence of policy responses. We focus especially our attention on two points. First, we try 
to determine to what extent international disturbances influence the domestic business cycles through 
trade and/or financial channels. Second, we analyze the impact of the adoption of different exchange 
rate regimes on the countries’ responses to shocks. All these features are the main issues in the 
literature relative to regional integration and OCA process. 
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1. Introduction 
The 1990s were characterized by an intensification of Regional Trade Agreements in the 
Americas. The main agreements are the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) –signed in 
1991 between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay (and more recently Venezuela), with 
Bolivia, Chili, Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador as associates- and the North American Free 
Trade Area (NAFTA) –signed in 1994 between Canada, Mexico and the United States with 
more and more agreements with other Latin American countries (LACs) (Chili, Peru, 
Ecuador…)1. Since 1994, a Free Trade Area Agreement for the Americas has been discussed, 
as an extension of the NAFTA. In the spirit of Eichengreen and Taylor (2004), this paper 
analyses the monetary consequences of this trade integration process. We consider a sample 
of five countries –Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay- that account for some 70 
per cent of the region’s GDP spanning the period 1991-Q1 – 2007-Q1. The paper assembles a 
quarterly dataset (see Appendix 1 for data sources) including both main international 
macroeconomic variables –such as the GDP of the Group of seven countries and the world 
commodities prices index- and main domestic variables –such as GDP and real exchange 
rates. In addition, we consider variables based on the literature dedicated to the sudden stop 
problem (Calvo et al., 2004): the Emerging Economy spread index and the foreign exchange 
reserves. 
The main question raised in this paper refers to the feasibility of a monetary union between 
these countries. To this end, we study whether this set of countries is characterized by 
business cycle synchronization with the occurrence of common shocks, a strong similarity in 
the adjustment process and the convergence of policy responses. We focus especially our 
attention on two points. First, we try to determine to what extent international disturbances 
influence the domestic business cycles through trade and/or financial channels. Second, we 
analyze the impact of the adoption of different exchange rate regimes on the countries’ 
responses to shocks. As shown in appendix 2, studied countries adopted very different 
exchange rate regimes over the 1991-2007 period. While at the beginning, the set of countries 
ranged from hard peg (Argentine currency board) to intermediate regimes, at the end, it 
exhibited a clear switch toward floating regimes. 
The present paper is linked to two separate strands of literature. The first one, dedicated to the 
debate of monetary union versus dollarization, includes numerous papers analyzing the 
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situation of Central and Latin American countries relative to the United States2. Empirical 
studies suggest that dollarization is not an obvious solution, even for Mexico. For instance, 
Karas (2003) finds that Mexican output fluctuations have been negatively correlated with the 
American fluctuations. According to Hallwood et al (2006), Brazilian, Chilean and 
Uruguayan permanent shocks are correlated with Argentina suggesting that a monetary union 
could be a better solution than dollarization. The second strand of literature analyzes the 
sources of business cycles fluctuations in emerging countries. Two lessons from this literature 
are especially interesting for our purpose. On the one hand, a large body of studies suggests 
that the main source of fluctuations originated from external factors. Aiolfi et al (2006) –
considering a sample of four LACs3- identify the presence of a common regional factor. 
Taking into account the weak intra-regional trade integration, this result suggests that the 
regional business cycle (major turning points are common to the four countries) is driven by 
external variables and common external shocks. On the other hand, the financial channel –
based on international interest rates for instance- seems more significant than the trade 
channel in understanding the influence of external shocks on domestic business cycle 
fluctuations in LACs4. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the methodology 
adopted in this paper and founded on Bayesian structural VAR models. Section 3 presents the 
macroeconomic variables included in the VAR, the results and the policy implications. 
Section 4 concludes. 
2. Methodology of the Study  
This paper rests on two important methodological points: on the one hand, we propose a way 
to take into account the structural breaks affecting LACs over the period and, on the other 
hand, we use a Bayesian structural VAR. 
2.1. Non-Stationarity and Structural Breaks: the Special Case of Emerging Economies  
The emerging economies case –and more especially LACs- is not the simplest for time series 
methodology. Indeed, this group of countries exhibits numerous structural breaks –e.g. the 
end of hyperinflation and the dramatic increase in commodities prices after 2000- and/or 
changes in policy regimes such as the exchange rate regimes collapses that result in new 
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monetary policy frameworks. Since the seminal works of Nelson and Plosser (1982), most 
macroeconomic time series in level are considered unit root process. On the same sample, 
Nelson and Plosser, Perron (1989) challenged this interpretation, indicating that most 
macroeconomic variables are trend stationary, coupled with structural breaks. Looking at the 
Latin-American macroeconomic time series, we assert the same hypothesis: the 
econometricians had to take into account structural breaks due to non-random external as well 
as internal shocks and policy regime changes. The right way to deal with this question 
consists (in the Perron procedure) of testing for unit roots in the presence of structural change 
at a known date. If the date of the break is uncertain, other tests are available (Vogelsang and 
Perron, 1998, or Zivot and Andrews, 2002) on common softwares. However, as shown in Le 
Bihan (2004) all these procedures are powerless when the number and the date of the break 
are unknown. Overall, the combination of a short sample and multiple breaks weaken the 
break diagnosis compared to the following unit root test.  
We choose a rougher but probably more secure method. First we identify the noticeable 
breaks of the figures5 as being the well-known historical ones (due for instance to balance of 
payments crisis or policy regime switches): the results are displayed in Appendix 3. As 
particular (and generally deterministic) events, these breaks can hardly be considered as the 
N.I.D. stochastic innovations of a random walk. Second, in order to stationarize the 
macroeconomic series, we clean them from the various deterministic trends and intercept 
leaps, using simple time trends and dummy variables. We finish with a common A.D.F. test, 
finding all series stationary. Thus, we can exclude any cointegration relationship but a VAR 
in level is an available alternative to the VECM one. We choose a recursive semi-structural 
approach for a VAR in level of the detrended series. 
2.2. A Bayesian Structural VAR 
Undeniably, the sample is short and the number of variables fairly high. In this case, 
Litterman (1979, 1984) suggests specifying blurred restrictions on the mean and variance of 
the coefficients instead of brutal “ad hoc” exclusions. As Doan (2007) concludes, “in a vector 
autoregression, we must concern ourselves not only with the lags of the dependent variables, 
but also with the lags of the other endogenous variables. Because of the stability conditions, 
we have some pretty good information about the size of lag coefficients in a simple 
autoregression. However, it’s not so clear what the sizes of the coefficients on the other 
variables should be, and these depend, in part, on the relative scales of the variables 
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involved”. As indicated by Canova (2007), priors on the mean and variance of the variable 
allow one to deal with over parametrization. 
The choice of priors is the simplest one: overweighting the first lags of endogenous variables 
of each equation. Although a fine tuning prior is unrealistic, a deeper investigation is 
necessary to provide a better assessment of the consequences of innovations but it could be 
time-wasting. 
In the same way, this version uses a semi structural BVAR. Using a Bayesian justifies once 
more avoiding structural orthogonalization: Canova (2007) shows that the combination of 
Bayesian methods and structural hypothesis is not the simplest one, particularly for economies 
characterised by a succession of policy regimes. 
3. The Model and the Results 
3.1. Variables selection 
Our variables are based on the traditional ones for VARs analyzing external shocks and 
macroeconomic packages in open economies and on the literature dedicated to the sudden 
stop problem. 
Each domestic VAR includes three external variables. As real external shocks, we consider (i) 
the Gross Domestic Product for the G7 (noted LGDPG7) and (ii) the world commodities 
prices excluding oil (noted WCPNO). Our choice to exclude oil from our commodities prices 
index is due to the fact that some LACs (for instance Brazil and Mexico) are both producers 
and consumers of oil. 
The Emerging Economy spread index of J.P. Morgan (EMBI)6 accounts for the international 
financial shock. Many studies choose US interest rates or international interest rates –such as 
LIBOR- to estimate the impact of external financial shocks on emerging markets. We prefer 
to use the EMBI in order to disentangle monetary policy shocks and financial shocks. Further, 
over our sample period, the EMBI does not seem significantly influenced by LIBOR, 
confirming the González-Rozada and Levy-Yeyati (2005) results which show that spreads are 
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 We merged two time series: the EMBI for the period 1991Q1-1997Q4 and the EMBI+ from 1998Q1. As 
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J.P.Morgan released a new index, the EMBIG (for “global”) embodying more countries (27) and more titles. In 
this last index, LAC decreased to 61.5%.  
 6 
determined by global factors7. Uribe and Yue (2006) analyze the respective influence of US 
interest rates and EMBI shocks on the macroeconomic fluctuations in a sample of seven 
emerging countries covering the period 1994-2001. An important finding is that EMBI shocks 
exacerbate the US interest rate shocks, implying a strong macroeconomic volatility in the 
studied emerging countries. 
For the domestic variables, we took the foreign reserves (FOREX) as proxy for the balance of 
payments, the gross domestic product (GDP), the consumption prices index (CPI), the 
nominal money market interest rate (R) and the real effective exchange rate8 (ER). 
Calvo et al. (2004) stress that sudden stop episodes are characterized by both international 
reserves losses and sharp current account reversals. The former increases the country’s 
vulnerability to shocks while the latter leads to output and employment contractions. 
Quarterly balance of payments data are not reliable and subject to sizable revisions. As a 
result, our VARs do not include current account data. As a proxy for sudden stop problems, 
we choose to include central bank’s foreign exchange reserves. In order to test the robustness 
of the results, we substitute the deseasonalized exports-imports ratio to FOREX. This ratio 
represents a proxy for the intertemporal constraint of the current account: a decrease in capital 
inflows imposes the reduction of absorption in order to increase exports and decrease imports. 
Interestingly, the results do not change significantly. As a result, we prefer to consider only 
the FOREX variables in order to avoid some interpretation difficulties owing to the fact that 
the ratio obeys in part competitive factors, and not exclusively financial factors. 
3.2. The Model 
The model is tested separately for each LAC. The number of lags –two in each model- has 
been selected using the common set of criteria and tests. As the inverse roots of the AR 
polynomial lie in the unit circle, VARs satisfy the stability condition. 
The following order of Choleski factorization is deduced from our theoretical interpretation of 
the contemporary correlation matrix of the reduced form residuals of each country model and 
from block exogeneity Wald tests. 
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with = A for Argentina, B for Brazil, C for Chile, M for Mexico, and U for Uruguay. 
External variables are considered the most exogenous. We assume that real external variables 
are predetermined relative to external financial ones. In addition, we consider that the GDP of 
the G7 countries exerts an influence on commodities prices through a demand effect. For 
domestic variables, different plausible orders have been experimented. They do not 
significantly change the results. 
3.3. Econometric findings 
Using this framework, we combine the impulse response functions (tracing out the time paths 
of the effects of pure shocks on the set of variables, see Appendix 4), and the forecast error 
variance decomposition (indicating the proportion of the movements in a sequence due to its 
own shocks versus to the other variables, see Appendix 5). This allows us to assess the degree 
of similarity in the reactions of macroeconomic variables to shocks amongst the set of 
countries. At the same time, we get a first outline of the specific -versus common- economic 
consequences of shocks in terms of spontaneous adjustments, as well as in terms of policy 
responses9. 
Responses of domestic variables to external shocks: is transmission real or financial? 
In all studied countries, GDP fluctuations are significantly influenced by foreign variables. 
Our results show that in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile foreign variables explain at least 29% of 
the GDP variance decompositions after 16 quarters. In Mexico and Uruguay, the shares are 
16.1% and 20% respectively. Above all, no domestic variables –except GDP itself- exert a 
greater influence than foreign innovations in all countries. 
As expected, GDP increases after a shock on GDPG7. The positive influence of GDPG7 
means that improvement (vs degradation) of the business cycle in G7 countries can result in 
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an increase (vs slowdown) of growth in LACs. The weak influence of GDPG7 in Brazil rests 
on the fact that this economy is a more closed economy relative to other studied countries. 
In all countries except Uruguay, GDP increases after a shock on commodities prices 
(WCPNO) confirming the importance of commodities in LACs’ business cycles. Not only are 
contemporaneous responses significant and positive but they continue to have significant 
persistent effects. 
A large body of empirical literature dedicated to the business cycle in LACs stresses that 
growth in these economies follows international capital flows. More precisely, these studies 
suggest that the behavior of capital inflows is pro-cyclical: they tend to increase when growth 
in LACs improves. As a result, we can expect a significant influence of EMBI shocks on GDP 
during the period on our sample of countries. We find that GDP decreases after a shock on 
EMBI. The magnitude of the GDP response is important in Argentina and Uruguay, and to a 
lesser extent in Mexico. The Chilean case is particularly interesting. While Chilean spread 
stayed substantially below EMBI+ or Latin American spread over the period, its GDP 
responds negatively to EMBI shock. Even if the response is weakly significant from a 
statistical point of view, this result suggests that this type of shock is global, i.e. affects all 
countries, even economies benefiting from low idiosyncratic risk premiums. 
Our findings confirm Allegret and Sand-Zantman (2008) with regard to the specific 
sensitivity of Argentina to EMBI shock. During the first half of the 90s, Argentina was one of 
the main borrowers in international capital markets enjoying very favorable financing 
conditions, while in the second half of the decade the economy, it suffered from a sudden-stop 
of capital inflows. In addition, the monetary policy constraints due to the currency board 
limited the ability of authorities to react in the face of EMBI shocks, inducing strong and 
ample macroeconomic variability. 
Overall, LACs differ according to the respective influence of trade and financial channels. 
Two groups of countries can thus be distinguished: in the first one, including Brazil, Chile and 
Mexico, trade channels predominate and in the second group, composed of Argentina and 
Uruguay, financial channels exert the main influence on GDP variances. In addition, as 
suggested by the Chilean experience, international financial shocks have a global nature. 
The relevance of the sudden stop 
Two main points characterize the sudden stop literature. First, external factors exert a decisive 
influence on capital inflows into emerging markets. Second, depreciation results in 
contractionary output in emerging markets whereas it produces traditional expansionist effects 
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in industrialized countries (Calvo and Reinhart, 2001). Indeed, exchange rate crises in 
emerging markets are followed by a sudden stop to capital inflows. These countries suffer 
from reserve losses and severe reversal in the current account deficit. Such reversal is based 
on a major decline in aggregates.  
In order to assess the relevance of the sudden stop literature, we determine what variables –
foreign or domestic, real or financial- exert the main influence on FOREX included in our 
VARs as a proxy of international capital flows. The theoretical prediction is that international 
financial shocks, here the EMBI shock- are the main variables influencing FOREX in our five 
countries. In addition, we analyze the influence of FOREX on other domestic variables. 
According to the sudden stop literature, a negative shock on FOREX must lead to a 
contraction in GDP. 
Interestingly, from the sudden stop literature standpoint, FOREX is influenced by 
international variables, and more specifically by financial variables. Thus, the international 
financial shock produces the expected effects when significant. An increase in the spread –
meaning degradation in the financial conditions for emerging countries- leads to a decrease in 
FOREX in Argentina and Brazil, and to a lesser extent in Chile after 3 quarters. Variance 
decompositions support the significant influence of EMBI on the behavior of FOREX. In 
Argentina, Brazil and Chile, EMBI innovations explain 15.4%; 8.2% and 7.8% of the FOREX 
variance. In each of the three countries, EMBI is its main explanatory variable. In addition, we 
find that FOREX does not respond to interest shocks. In other words, increasing domestic 
interest rates is insufficient to induce the accumulation of international reserves. Such a result 
is in accordance with the sudden stop literature that suggests that FOREX responds more to 
global shocks than domestic ones. 
A FOREX shock generates few domestic fluctuations. This deceptive result does not 
necessarily contradict the sudden stop literature. Indeed, as stressed by Izquierdo et al. (2007), 
episodes of financial volatility tend to produce effects on real variables only in short-run. A 
plausible explanation is that the more significant effects of sudden stop on domestic variables 
are absorbed extremely rapidly, within one or two quarters. VAR models in levels are not 
well-equipped to detect these types of changes. Indeed, such models analyze the responses of 
macroeconomic variables to shocks of standard magnitude (usually one standard deviation), 
and not to unusual disturbances proper to crisis episodes. In addition, the main purpose of 
VAR models is not to identify crisis events. Crisis episodes are relevant only if they lead to 
structural breaks in the studied macroeconomic series. 
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Finally, we see that GDP decreases in the aftermath of the real depreciation. Three competing 
explanations are advanced in this paper. First, real depreciations may be indicative of 
economic activity slowdown in the medium-term. This interpretation is not confirmed by the 
behavior of the FOREX variable. Indeed, while a negative response of FOREX to a real 
depreciation is expected –due to capital outflows - we observe in fact insignificant reactions 
of this variable. Real exchange rates innovations do not explain a significant share of FOREX 
variance in the five countries. Second, an alternative explanation of the negative relationship 
between GDP and real depreciations rests on the presence of negative balance sheet effects. 
The inability to borrow abroad in local currency –the so-called original sin- and the 
dollarization of the domestic economy can induce currency mismatch in the balance sheets of 
public and private agents. Using the degree of dollarization estimated by Reinhart, Rogoff and 
Savastano (2003), such explanation seems relevant only in Argentina and Uruguay10. Finally, 
a last explanation, most likely relevant in countries with low degrees of dollarization (Brazil, 
Chile and Mexico) suggests that the negative correlation between GDP and real exchange rate 
depreciations stems from shocks that induce both a real depreciation and a decline in GDP. 
Negative terms of trade shocks result in such negative correlation. 
Credibility matters 
Given the importance of the inflationary history of numerous LACs, the responses of interest 
rates to innovations in consumption prices are particularly significant. Responses of interest 
rates are especially important to consider because they allow us to discriminate between 
credible and less credible countries. In Argentina and Chile, interest rates decrease or do not 
react after a CPI shock. In these two countries, inflation expectations are well anchored by the 
monetary regime in place in each country. Recall that from 1991 to 2001, Argentina had 
experienced a currency board arrangement while Chile had adopted an inflation targeting 
framework since 1991. In countries with soft pegs and a monetary policy not based on an 
inflation targeting framework –as Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay- inflation expectations are 
imperfectly anchored. So, in such countries, shocks on prices induce higher fluctuations. 
Variance decompositions exhibit a clear picture. In Argentina and Chile, CPI innovations 
explain a mild or marginal share of the interest rates variances, respectively 8.7 and 0.2 
contemporaneously; and 12.8 and 1.8 after 16 quarters, while in Brazil the respective shares 
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are 70.9% and 68.2%. In this latter country interest rate innovations explain only a weak share 
of the CPI variance (0% contemporaneously and 10.2% after 16 quarters). As expected, CPI 
shocks lead to real exchange rate appreciations. In comparison with countries enjoying 
imperfect monetary credibility, the responses of the real exchange rates are short-lived in 
Argentina and Chile. 
3.4. Policy recommendations 
Recently, a set of publications displayed a critical balance of stabilization and structural 
reforms in emerging economies, and particularly in the LA ones. In line with a large stream of 
critics on the “Washington-Consensus-style” reforms, the contribution of Hausmann, Rodrik, 
and Velasco (2005) rejects the idea of a unified paradigm altogether, advocating idiosyncratic 
policies adjusted to specific features and constraints. But these conclusions are not shared by 
all observers: for Zettelmeyer (2006) the unusually high macroeconomic volatility of the last 
decades is a common feature of the main part of LACs, in spite of recent improvements in 
macroeconomic management and structural reforms. Singh (2004) explains this vulnerability 
by a combination of domestic and foreign factors. From the domestic side, he listed mainly 
fiscal rigidities, weak institutions, low productivity, strong inequalities and unemployment or 
insufficient market competition. The consequences are excess demand, inflation, financial 
instability, external imbalance and unofficial dollarization.  
These characteristics limit the scope for macroeconomic management faced with external 
shocks (unstable terms of trade or sudden stops of capital flows). Further, from an optimal 
currency area perspective such volatility could hinder regional integration, increasing the 
costs of policy coordination.  
Our outcomes are in line with this evidence, entailing two main policy implications. First, 
foreign variables bring on a near-common business cycle in the region: LACs tend to react 
similarly to the same foreign shocks whatever the exchange rate regime. Above all, we do not 
detect significant adverse asymmetric external shocks among our studied countries even if 
different degrees and types of dollarization imply that LACs are more or less sensitive to 
international financial shocks. In other words, most external shocks are common to LACs and 
characterize global shocks. Contrary to several studies, we also find that real channels seem as 
important as financial ones in explaining the influence of foreign variables on domestic ones 
in our sample. Faced with such a common fate, an important question is to determine to what 
extent a monetary union may insulate against such shocks. Using probit panel regressions to 
investigate whether countries forming a monetary union have a lower occurrence of sudden 
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stop episodes and of current account reversal episodes, and whether they are better able to 
absorb external shocks, Edwards (2006) finds that belonging to a currency union has not 
lowered the probability of a sudden stop or a current account reversal, and external shocks 
have been amplified in currency union countries. 
Another way to face adverse foreign shocks is to favour more exchange rate flexibility in 
order to use them as bumper. Besides, since 2002 LACs exhibit a clear shift to more flexible 
exchange rates. Obviously, it leads to higher bilateral exchange rate volatility and as such,  it 
may be unfavourable to economic and financial integration. But this stage could be a 
transitory process, necessary to put the house in order if during this adjustment, LACs 
strengthen policy coordination. Institutional frameworks for this purpose already exist: for 
instance, in the Mercosur case, the Protocol of Ushuaia (1997) established a permanent 
structure dedicated to coordination. Targets and procedures intended to allow the convergence 
of public deficits and the debt ratios were defined. A high-level macroeconomic Group of 
surveillance equivalent to the Ecofin council in the European Union was created. In 2002 the 
project of the Monetary Institute for Mercosur was launched. Clearly, policy coordination 
improves the ability of LACs to respond to external shocks, but coordination does not suffice: 
LACs may create a regional monetary fund in order to use it in case of adverse external 
shocks. The boom in commodity prices –that began in 2002- is an exceptional opportunity to 
favor the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves dedicated to this fund. The main point is 
that such a regional fund, already envisaged in East and South-East Asia, may function as a 
mutual insurance mechanism11. But is such a mechanism optimal in case of symmetric 
shocks? It is dubious. First because international financial markets could better allocate risks 
between countries in which the business cycles are asymmetric than in a set of countries 
sharing the same business cycle (except perhaps in case of high transactions costs 
differentials) (see Obstfeld, 1995)12. Second because the strong correlation between country 
risk ratings and risk of contagion effects in regional zones as the Mercosur can be explain by 
the imperfect information prevailing in international financial market: each time one of the 
partners –and particularly one of the largest- was overtaken by a crisis, the most prevalent 
reaction amongst the other members was a fear of spillovers. As noted by Machinea and 
Rozenwurcel (2005), the usual response of policy makers in other countries has been to send 
                                                 
11
 A detailed analysis of insurance mechanisms for LACs in beyond the scope of this paper. For an overview, see 
World Bank (2007). 
12
 As noted by the World Bank, the problem overcomes the LAC area as for any mutual found or market 
insurance “the diversification margin is relatively limited in light of the high correlation of credit risk within the 
emerging market class, limiting the potential size of credible coverage and increasing its costs”, (World Bank, 
2007: 22-23). 
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out signal that differentiates them from their distressed neighbor in an effort to influence the 
mainstream perception on financial markets13. Obviously, the contagion issue is linked with 
the credibility one.    
The question of domestic credibility is the second policy issue of our paper, in particular 
monetary policy credibility. Indeed, our estimates do not allow us to distinguish countries 
according to their exchange rate regimes. A better distinction to analyze responses to similar 
shocks is based on the different degrees of credibility. As is well-known, LACs have a long 
history of inflation resulting in fragile inflation expectations anchors. Since the beginning of 
1990s, credibility gains have been impressive in LACs. The main point is that, as suggested 
by the endogenous OCA approach, differences in authorities’ credibility may represent an 
impediment to the convergence targets. To favor economic policy convergence, it seems 
important that LACs adopt a similar anchor. Shock asymmetry between the LACs and the 
United States implies that the US dollar is not a good candidate. As a result, LACs need an 
alternative anchor to dollarization to avoid “the perennial misuse of monetary policy” by their 
central banks (Corbo, 2001: 246). Trade diversity from a geographic point of view may favor 
a peg to a common currency basket. But such a peg lacks transparency. An alternative 
solution, suggested by Eichengreen and Taylor (2004 and more recently by Rose (2007), 
would be for LACs to adopt a similar inflation target in the conduct of their monetary policy. 
Brazil, Chile and Mexico have already adopted such a monetary framework. Inflation 
targeting provides two main advantages that are especially important for LACs. First, central 
banks with inflation targeting tend to strengthen their credibility. Second, not only is such 
monetary regime more viable than fixed or intermediate exchange rate arrangements, but it 
also favors exchange rate stability. In other words, it seems possible to decrease bilateral 
exchange rate volatility without an explicit coordination mechanism that is very difficult to 
implement in the area. A similar monetary framework –less ambitious relative to policy 
coordination- may lead to less volatility. Recent evidence exhibits mixed results. Brazil, Chile 
and Mexico have experienced better inflation performance than Argentina and Uruguay, two 
countries that have adopted a monetary aggregate target in the aftermath of their exchange 
rate regime collapse. From this standpoint, inflation targeting has improved economic policy 
credibility in significant LACS. But at the same time, Argentine and Uruguayan experiences 
suggest that the authorities of these two countries follow a de facto managed floating regime 
                                                 
13
 And the authors explain: “Their reason for doing so is that the adverse effects to be expected in the short run 
have been of such magnitude, and the decision-making horizon for governmental and private-sector actors has 
shortened to such a point that the ratio between the perceived costs and benefits of integration has grown 
drastically worse”. 
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in which their exchange rates are confined within a very narrow range. As a consequence, 
these multiples objectives damage the credibility of their central banks leading to a slowdown 
of their inflation convergence towards the Brazilian and the Mexican indexes (the best 
performers). Such a policy does not favor economic policy convergence between LACS. 
Credibility gains may also favor the financial structure convergence among LACs. As our 
results above suggest, the lack of financial structure convergence -mainly due to different 
degrees and types of dollarization- is an additional factor explaining the slow economic policy 
convergence. Indeed, dollarized countries such as Argentina and Uruguay are especially 
sensitive to specific shocks (external financial shocks inducing real exchange rates 
depreciations) limiting their ability to converge with other LACs from an economic policy 
point of view. More credible monetary policies may lead to a decrease in the degree of 
dollarization, reducing the currency mismatch and the external financial vulnerabilities of 
LACs. Indeed, as stressed by Levy-Yeyati (2006), dollarization is a rational response of 
economic agents to expectations of high and volatile inflation. Recent trends are promising. 
Except Uruguay, and to a lesser extent Argentina, all studied countries have significantly 
reduced their currency mismatch since 2001 (IMF, 2007: 35). Cowan et al (2006) show that 
not only domestic public debt follows a significant dedollarization trend, but also that some 
LACs are now able to borrow in domestic currency in international capital markets decreasing 
the magnitude of the original sin14. 
4. Concluding remarks 
Our results converge to indicate that LACs are influenced by foreign variables, either real 
ones for Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, or financial ones for Argentina and Uruguay. Our attempt 
to test the relevance of the sudden stop literature leads us to mixed conclusions. If our proxy 
of international capital inflows –the FOREX variables- is significantly explained by foreign 
financial variables, the analysis of domestic variable responses to FOREX shocks does not 
follow the predictions of common knowledge. 
We need to be cautious in the interpretation of our results. On the one hand, our analysis does 
not take into account the real convergence process. Camarero et al. (2006) study such a 
process by considering productivity differences among Mercosur countries. Over the period 
1960-1999, the authors find the presence of a “Mercosur club” meaning a real convergence 
process. Regional integration has played a significant role in this process. As suggested by 
                                                 
14
 According to the authors, the size of the economy and the degree of development of domestic financial 
markets exert an influence on this trend. This latter factor is in part linked with macroeconomic policy 
credibility. 
 15 
Camarero et al. (2006), real convergence raises the question of the level of the exchange rate 
chosen by each country at the entering date in the monetary union. Indeed, as most LACs 
know, during a catching-up process, their equilibrium exchange rates may change. On the 
other hand, our VAR models ignore regional interdependencies despite the fact that spillovers 
within the region exert a significant influence on the LACs’ business cycles. For instance, 
Uruguayan economic activity depends mainly on Argentine and Brazilian business cycles. In 
addition, some empirical studies suggest that financial market interdependencies may explain 
exchange rates movements within the region15. 
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Appendix 1 Data and Sources 
 
Data Sources 
GDP Group of Seven OECD 
World commodities prices excluding oil IMF, International Financial Statistics 
EMBI Ministry of Economy and Production of the Republic of Argentina 
(http://www.mecon.gov.ar/peconomica/basehome/infoeco_ing.html) 
GDP  IPEA (http://www.ipea.gov.br) for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and 
Mexico 
Central Bank of the Republic of Uruguay 
Consumption Prices Index IMF, International Financial Statistics 
Foreign Exchange Reserves IMF, International Financial Statistics 
Money Market Interest Rates IMF, International Financial Statistics for Argentina, Brazil, 
Mexico, and Uruguay 
Central Bank of Chile for Chile 
Real Exchange rates IMF, International Financial Statistics for Chile and Uruguay 
Central Bank of Argentina for Argentina 
IPEA for Brazil 
OECD for Mexico 
 
 
Appendix 2 Exchange Rate Regimes in the Selected Latin American Countries 
 
 
 
Countries Year/Month Exchange rate regime Countries Year/Month Exchange rate regime 
Argentina 
1990-M1 Independently floating 
Brazil (cont.) 
1998-M4 Forward-looking crawling peg 
 1991-M1 Horizontal band  1999-M1 Independently floating 
 1991-M3 Currency board 
Chile 
1990-M1 Backward-looking crawling peg 
 2001M12 Managed floating  1998-M9 Forward-looking crawling peg 
 2004M11 Other tightly managed floating  1999-M9 Independently floating 
Brazil 
1990-M1 Backward-looking crawling peg 
Mexico 
1990-M1 Forward-looking crawling peg 
 1990-M3 Managed floating  1994-M12 Independently floating 
 1991-M5 Backward-looking crawling peg 
Uruguay 
1990_M1 Backward-looking crawling peg 
 1994-M7 Tightly managed  1992_M1 Forward-looking crawling peg 
 1995-M3 Backward-looking crawling peg  2002-M6 Independently floating 
 
Source: from A. Bubula and I. Ötker-Robe’s Database. 
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Appendix 3: Structural breaks  
 
International Variables 
 
 
The Commodity Prices and the EMBI are both marked by a structural break from the last 
quarter of 2001, due to the simultaneity of a Commodity Prices hike and a decrease of EMBI. 
 
Domestic Variables 
 
Argentina :  
Except the economic mayhem at the beginning of the 90s, the only structural break (intercepts 
and trends) comes from the exchange rate collapse of 2002. Attacks on Foreign Reserves are 
perceptible since 2001, with the unhooking of both the Foreign Reserves and the Interest 
Rate.  About one year later, it hits the Exchange Rate, the GDP and the CPI. 
Let us note in particular that the Tequila contagion (after the Mexican Crisis of 1994-95) is 
not obviously perceptible.  
Brazil:  
Two well known events are worthy of note: the Real Plan in 1994 and the currency crash of 
1998-99. But in 2002, the Argentinean crisis contagion and the political uncertainty of the 
presidential election weighed on the Exchange Rate. Except this point, we had to introduce a 
break for 1994 in the CPI, the Foreign Reserves, and the Interest Rate (but curiously neither 
for the real Exchange Rate nor the GDP). The 1998-1999 crisis hit significantly the Exchange 
Rate and the Foreign Reserves (but neither the CPI nor the interest rate).      
Chili: 
The Chilean economy is particularly sensible to international financial mayhem: so, the main 
break is due to the Asian Crisis, in 1997, hitting all the variables except the GDP. But the 
uncertainty following the Argentinean crisis is perceptible as much on the Exchange Rate as 
on the Interest Rate.  
Mexico: 
Obviously, the Currency Crash of 1994-95 hit all the real and nominal variables, beginning in 
the last quarter of 1994 with the Foreign Reserves, the Interest Rate, and then hurting the 
Exchange Rate, the CPI, and the GDP in 1995. 
Uruguay: 
The introduction of structural breaks in the case of Uruguay could be discussed. Although 
some shocks are obviously non-random ones, the high frequency of macro-fluctuations in the 
Uruguayan case makes break detection difficult. However, two shocks are clearly perceptible, 
with a break on the GDP (due to the Brazilian Currency Crash at the end of 1998) and a break 
on all the macroeconomic variables (except the CPI) after the Argentinean Crisis of 2002.   
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Appendix 4 Forecast Error Impulse Responses of One Standard Deviation (Innovations 
±2 SE) 
1- Are International Transmission Real or Financial? 
 
Figures display for each country the responses of GDP to GDPG7, WPNCO and EMBI 
shocks respectively. 
Argentina:            shocks  
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Chile:                     shocks  
       GDPG7         WPNCO           EMBI  
Mexico:                 shocks  
       GDPG7         WPNCO           EMBI  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
- 0.010
- 0.005
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
-0.010
-0.005
0. 000
0. 005
0. 010
0. 015
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
-0.010
-0.005
0. 000
0. 005
0. 010
0. 015
- 0.010
- 0.005
 
CYC_LM_GDP
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
-0.0050
-0.0025
0. 0000
0. 0025
0. 0050
0. 0075
0. 0100
0. 0125
0. 0150
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
-0. 0050
-0. 0025
0.0000
0.0025
0.0050
0.0075
0.0100
0.0125
0.0150
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
- 0.0050
- 0.0025
0.0000
0.0025
0.0050
0.0075
0.0100
0.0125
0.0150
 
Uruguay:               shocks  
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2- Credibility matters 
 
Figures display for each country the responses of R and ER to CPI shocks respectively. 
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Uruguay :     Responses of  
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Appendix 5 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition for 16 periods, in percentage 
 
The results display the fraction of variance in a given variable (in %) after 16 quarters due to 
foreign and domestic shocks indicated in columns.  
 
Decomposition of Variance for Series GDP  
 LGDPG7 LWCPNO EMBI GDP CPI FOREX R ER 
Argentina 6.75 7.73 14.79 61.71 0.37 6.22 1.27 1.15 
Brazil 26.48 23.48 0.98 29.89 7.35 4.67 0.48 6.68 
Chile 5.26 39.04 1.57 31.86 11.22 2.91 4.31 3.85 
Mexico 3.16 7.79 5.12 60.18 4.75 1.06 5.73 12.22 
Uruguay 1.27 3.18 15.50 67.32 0.18 0.70 8.25 3.59 
 
 
Decomposition of Variance for Series CPI (Prices Indexes) 
 LGDPG7 LWCPNO EMBI GDP CPI FOREX R ER 
Argentina 11.28 12.88 2.43 14.91 36.05 16.62 4.96 0.87 
Brazil 8.44 4.07 2.77 6.60 64.12 1.53 10.20 2.27 
Chile 0.22 11.80 5.86 0.32 69.46 10.00 0.09 2.25 
Mexico 2.42 0.31 1.49 3.21 80.15 11.85 0.13 0.43 
Uruguay 16.01 31.10 10.04 6.46 21.63 1.04 9.05 4.68 
 
 
Decomposition of Variance for Series FOREX (Foreign Exchange) 
 LGDPG7 LWCPNO EMBI GDP CPI FOREX R ER 
Argentina 2.38 3.09 15.43 17.72 3.13 56.73 1.02 0.49 
Brazil 7.33 1.20 8.21 5.51 2.63 69.92 3.06 2.13 
Chile 1.11 0.71 7.79 0.29 3.72 85.67 0.58 0.12 
Mexico 5.23 10.76 0.63 2.42 14.99 61.79 3.02 1.15 
Uruguay 2.09 1.41 1.68 8.49 0.52 80.88 2.84 2.09 
 
 
Decomposition of Variance for Series R (Domestic Interest Rates) 
 LGDPG7 LWCPNO EMBI GDP CPI FOREX R ER 
Argentina 8.79 2.68 1.28 4.59 12.79 1.70 51.94 16.21 
Brazil 3.97 0.37 1.79 9.59 68.19 4.74 10.81 0.52 
Chile 12.33 4.32 21.37 4.29 1.84 3.85 51.75 0.25 
Mexico 6.59 4.44 6.98 6.46 21.35 8.24 44.31 1.63 
Uruguay 0.78 0.23 3.19 2.11 3.77 2.68 84.78 2.45 
 
 
Decomposition of Variance for Series ER (real exchange rates) 
 LGDPG7 LWCPNO EMBI GDP CPI FOREX R ER 
Argentina 2.98 15.99 1.29 21.42 12.86 9.24 8.80 27.41 
Brazil 8.88 2.22 7.57 3.65 5.38 3.39 6.59 62.31 
Chile 4.72 7.82 4.09 2.11 0.78 3.63 0.82 76.04 
Mexico 0.34 3.05 2.17 3.44 21.87 4.74 17.43 46.96 
Uruguay 8.12 2.55 13.32 15.14 7.84 8.02 1.88 43.13 
 
 
 
 
